What To Do About Iran

[caption id=“attachment_12395” align=“alignleft” width=“225”] Photo by Bob Cartwright[/caption] by Barnett Zumoff In the course of the very active media discussion about what should be done about Iran, certain things seem to be taken as self-evident axioms:

1. Iran is a threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East and the entire world. The threat is aggravated by the likelihood that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons in the near future.
2. Iran is an “existential” threat to Israel.
3. The U.S. has an obligation to defend Israel by preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
4. In the fulfillment of that obligation, no methods are precluded—specifically, military action (i.e., bombing Iran) “remains on the table,” as both President Obama and Mitt Romney keep reiterating, while “containment,” they reiterate, is “off the table.”

Much of the discussion centers on Point 4: At what point will it be necessary to take military action, who should do it (U.S., Israel, or both), and what should be the “redlines,” crossing which should trigger military action. The tone of the discussion has been not “whether” to take military action but “when.” I want to suggest urgently that we all need to step back and re-examine the axioms of the discussion, to see whether they hold up to scrutiny, and we need to consider more carefully the consequences of resorting to military action against Iran. To begin with, let me say that I think military action against Iran should be taken off the table and containment should be put back on the table, despite the fact that Iran is indeed actively trying to develop nuclear weapons (there is no doubt about that, no matter what smokescreens Iran puts up.) In considering why such a reorientation of current approaches would be more rational, it is helpful to consider the history of the Soviet Union’s development of nuclear weapons, which sheds light on our current issue with Iran. Why did the Soviets feel constrained to develop such weapons? The Soviets felt that the U.S. and its allies had as a goal the overthrow of their Communist system of government (they were right), and they felt that having nuclear weapons would somehow prevent that. The logic of that “preventive” strategy always escaped me, and in the end the Soviets turned out to be wrong: our continued pressure on them (”containment,” as George Kennan called it), without our ever using military force, did ultimately result in the overthrow of their governmental system and the substitution of a more democratic one (relative to the history of that part of the world.) Whatever physical threat the Soviet Union posed to the U.S. disappeared, despite their continued possession of not just a few but thousands of nuclear weapons. Iran, too, feels, in some misguided way, that obtaining nuclear weapons will bolster their national pride and dignity and, more importantly, will prevent the Western powers from overthrowing the Khomeinist system of government, which they feel (correctly) is a goal of the U.S. and its allies. That “preventive” approach is just as illogical for Iran now as it was for the Soviet Union then. Continuing the analogy with the Soviet Union, I think that sustained “containment” of Iran, (i.e., sustained crippling economic sanctions), again without our using military force, will ultimately lead to the overthrow of the Khomeinist government and the establishment of a more democratic government (perhaps even more democratic than that of today’s Russia, in light of the well educated, broadly pro-democratic youth of today’s Iran.) Such a change in Iran’s government would do more to permanently insure against nuclear aggression by Iran than any physical attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which in any case could only stop their weapons development partially and temporarily. We also need to ask what Iran would do with a few nuclear weapons anyway. Let us recall that the Soviet Union had thousand of nuclear weapons for decades and never used them. Of course this forbearance on their part was encouraged by the existence of the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) doctrine of the U.S., which made it clear that the Soviet Union would be physically destroyed if it attacked anyone with its nuclear weapons; it is similarly clear that Iran would face certain physical destruction if it used nuclear weapons, whether against Israel or against anyone else. Wherein is Iran different from the Soviet Union? Do we think that Iran’s leaders are simply psychotically irrational with respect to their hatred for Israel? Their leaders have indeed more than once threatened to destroy Israel. In regard to that question, however, it is noteworthy that the recently retired leader of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, stated that he was quite sure the leaders of Iran were entirely rational — and he is probably a better judge of that than most of us. Other analysts have come to that conclusion too. As for the Iranian threat to destroy Israel, let us not forget that Nikita Khruschev said publicly about the U.S.: “We will bury you!” That remark didn’t presage an attack on the U.S., and the remarks by Iran’s leaders don’t necessarily presage an attack on Israel. Some of those who worry about Iran’s attacking Israel raise an interesting question, however: perhaps Iran will give nuclear weapons to its terrorist henchmen in Hezbollah or Hamas, so they can destroy Israel instead of Iran’s having to do it by themselves? That, too, is extremely unlikely: after Iran will have expended an enormous amount of money and with much effort and great risk will have acquired nuclear weapons to “protect” itself and bolster its national dignity and its hegemony over the Middle East, it seems unreasonable that the nationalistic, chauvinistic leaders of Iran would simply give away finished nuclear weapons (just nuclear materials would be useless) to its henchmen and surrogates, thereby allowing them to claim the glory and the credit for destroying Israel without having assumed any of the costs and risks of the nuclear weapons development. Israel’s constant restatements that “Iran poses an existential threat to us” are fundamentally based on the threats by Iranian leaders to destroy them. If an analysis suggests that Iran’s use of nuclear weapons against Israel would be irrational and unlikely, and would result in its own destruction (and that, indeed, is my analysis), then the “existential” nature of Iran’s threat to Israel would seem to be exaggerated, even if Iran does acquire nuclear weapons. What are my final conclusions? I think that we in the West should maintain crippling sanctions against Iran, not to stop it from acquiring nuclear weapons (it won’t do that) but to put pressure on the Iranian people to overthrow the Khomeinist system, which I think the sanctions will ultimately accomplish — recent reports state that Iran’s economy is already near collapse. Call that “containment,” if you like. After all, containment of the Soviet Union was one of the most successful political policies in the history of the world. I do not think that nuclear weapons in Iran’s hands pose an existential threat to Israel or anyone else — why would a nuclear Iran be any more dangerous than the crazies in Pakistan, or than any of the other nuclear powers? On the other hand, if Israel starts a war against Iran, or goads the U.S. into doing so, we will all be very, very sorry. Not only will it be an unnecessary war (cf. Iraq), but the physical destruction of Israel will be frightful beyond comprehension. Boiling it down to an “elevator conversation”:

1. Continued heavy sanctions against Iran — yes.
2. War against Iran, by either the U.S. or Israel — no.

Barnett Zumoff, a member of the Jewish Currents editorial board, was the four-term president of the Workmen’s Circle/Arbeter Ring and is a retired Air Force Reserve general.